Design of Policy-Aware Differentially Private Algorithms by Haney, Samuel et al.
Design of Policy-Aware Differentially Private Algorithms
Samuel Haney
Duke University
Durham, NC, USA
shaney@cs.duke.edu
Ashwin Machanavajjhala
Duke University
Durham, NC, USA
ashwin@cs.duke.edu
Bolin Ding
Microsoft Research
Redmond, WA, USA
bolin.ding@microsoft.com
ABSTRACT
The problem of designing error optimal differentially private
algorithms is well studied. Recent work applying differential
privacy to real world settings have used variants of differen-
tial privacy that appropriately modify the notion of neigh-
boring databases. The problem of designing error optimal
algorithms for such variants of differential privacy is open.
In this paper, we show a novel transformational equivalence
result that can turn the problem of query answering under
differential privacy with a modified notion of neighbors to
one of query answering under standard differential privacy,
for a large class of neighbor definitions.
We utilize the Blowfish privacy framework that generalizes
differential privacy. Blowfish uses a policy graph to instan-
tiate different notions of neighboring databases. We show
that the error incurred when answering a workload W on a
database x under a Blowfish policy graph G is identical to
the error required to answer a transformed workload fG(W)
on database gG(x) under standard differential privacy, where
fG and gG are linear transformations based on G. Using this
result, we develop error efficient algorithms for releasing his-
tograms and multidimensional range queries under different
Blowfish policies. We believe the tools we develop will be
useful for finding mechanisms to answer many other classes
of queries with low error under other policy graphs.
1. INTRODUCTION
The problem of private release of statistics from databases
has become very important with the increasing use of databases
with sensitive information about individuals in government
and commercial organizations. -Differential privacy [4] has
become the standard for private release of statistics due to
its strong guarantee that “similar” inputs must yield “sim-
ilar” outputs. Two input databases are similar if they are
neighbors, meaning that they differ in the presence or ab-
sence of a single record. Output similarity is quantified by
, which bounds the log-odds of generating the same output
from any pair of neighbors. Thus, if a record corresponds to
all the data from one individual, differential privacy ensures
that a single individual does not influence the inferences that
can be drawn from the released statistics. Small  results in
greater privacy but also lesser utility. Thus,  can be used
to trade-off privacy for utility.
However, in certain applications (e.g., [18]), the differen-
tial privacy guarantee is too strict to produce private release
of data that has any non-trivial utility. Tuning the param-
eter  is not helpful here: enlarging  degrades the privacy
guaranteed without a commensurate improvement in utility.
Hence, recent work has considered relaxing differential pri-
vacy by modifying the notion of neighboring inputs by defin-
ing some metric over the space of all databases. Application
designers can use this in addition to  to better tradeoff pri-
vacy for utility. This idea has been applied to graphs (edge-
versus vertex-differential privacy [18]), streams (event- in-
stead of individual-privacy [7]), location privacy (geo-indist-
inguishability [1]) and to study fairness in targeted adver-
tising ([5]), and has been formalized by multiple proposed
frameworks ([3, 11, 13]). While these relaxations permit al-
gorithms with significantly better utility than the standard
notion of differential privacy, such algorithms must be de-
signed from scratch. It is unknown how to derive algorithms
that optimally leverage the relaxed privacy guarantee pro-
vided by the modified notion of neighbors to result in the
least loss of utility. For instance, there are no known algo-
rithms for releasing histograms or answering range queries
with high utility under geo-indistinguishability. Moreover,
there is no known method to utilize the literature on differ-
entially private algorithms for this purpose.
In this paper we present a novel and theoretically sound
methodology for designing algorithms for relaxed privacy no-
tions using algorithms that satisfy differential privacy, thus
bridging the algorithm design problem under different pri-
vacy notions. Our results apply to the Blowfish privacy
framework [11], which generalizes differential privacy by al-
lowing for different notions of neighboring databases (or pri-
vacy policies). We use this methodology to derive novel al-
gorithms that satisfy Blowfish under relaxed privacy policies
for releasing histograms and multi-dimensional range queries
that have significantly better utility than the best known dif-
ferentially private algorithms for these tasks. In the rest of
this section, we present an overview of our results, describe
the outline of the paper and then discuss related work.
Overview of Our Results. We first informally introduce
the Blowfish privacy framework to help understand our the-
oretical and algorithmic results. The Blowfish framework
instantiates a large class of “similarity” or neighbor defi-
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nitions, using a “policy graph” defined over the domain of
database records. Two input databases are neighbors if they
differ in one record, and the differing values form an edge
(u, v) in the policy graph. Thus, one can not infer whether
an individual’s value was u or v based on the released output.
For example, consider a grid policy graph (we will study its
general form later in this paper): uniformly divide a 2D map
into k×k grid cells, and each database record is one of the k2
grid cells; only “nearby” points, e.g., pairs within Manhat-
tan distance θ, are connected by edges in the policy graph.
Such a policy when used for location data implies that it
is acceptable to reveal the rough location of an individual
(e.g., the city), as two points belonging to two different cities
are far away so no edge in the policy graph connects them;
however, it requires that fine-grained location information
(e.g., whether the individual is at home or at a nearby cafe)
be hidden, when two grid points are close enough. This spe-
cial instance of Blowfish framework is similar to a recently
proposed notion called geo-indistinguishability [1].
Our main result is called transformational equivalence,
and we aim to show that a mechanism M for answering
a set of linear queries W on a database x satisfies (,G)-
Blowfish privacy (i.e., differential privacy where neighbor-
ing databases are constructed with respect to the policy
graph G) if and only if M is a mechanism for answer-
ing a transformed set of queries fG(W) on a transformed
database gG(x) that satisfies -differential privacy. Here, fG
and gG are linear transformations. However, we can not
hope to prove such an equivalence in general. We prove
(Theorem 4.4) that such an equivalence result implies that
there exist a method to embed distances on any graph G
to distances in the L1 metric without any distortion. This
is because the distance between two input datasets induced
by the neighborhood relation for differential privacy is the
L1 metric, and the distance under Blowfish is related to dis-
tances on graph G. Such a distortion free embedding is not
known for large classes of graphs (e.g., a cycle) [17].
Nevertheless, we are able to show this equivalence result
for a large class of mechanisms and for a large class of graphs.
First, we show that the transformational equivalence result
holds for all algorithms that are instantiations of the matrix
mechanism framework [15]. Matrix mechanisms algorithms,
like Laplace mechanism for releasing histograms, and hierar-
chical mechanism [10] and Privelet [20] for answering range
queries, are popular building blocks for differentially pri-
vate algorithm design. Transformational equivalence holds
for such data independent mechanisms since the noise in-
troduced by such mechanisms is independent of the input
database. (The negative result uses a data-dependent mech-
anism whose error depends on the input database).
Next, we are also able to show that when G is a tree there
exist linear transformations fG and gG such that any mech-
anism M for answering W on database x satisfies (,G)-
Blowfish privacy if and only if M is an -differentially pri-
vate mechanism for answering fG(W) on database gG(x).
The result follows (though not immediately) from the fact
that trees permit a distortion free embedding into the L1
metric [8, 17]. This result holds for all privacy mechanisms,
including data-dependent mechanisms.
Finally, while the equivalence result does not hold for gen-
eral mechanisms and general policy graphs, we can achieve
an approximate equivalence. More specifically, we show the
following subgraph approximation result: if G and G′ are
such that every edge (u, v) in G is connected by a path of
length at most ` in G′, then a mechanism M that ensures
(` · ,G′)-Blowfish privacy also ensures (,G)-Blowfish pri-
vacy. Thus, if for a graph G there is a tree T such that dis-
tances in G are not distorted by more than a multiplicative
factor of ` in the tree T , then there exist transformations fT
and gT such that an -differentially private mechanism M
for answering fT (W) on database gT (x), is also an (` · ,G)-
Blowfish private mechanism for answering W on x.
Additionally, a direct consequence of transformational equiv-
alence is it allows us to derive error lower bounds and general
approximation algorithms for Blowfish private mechanisms
by extending work on error lower bounds for differentially
private mechanisms [9, 2, 19, 16]. We refer the reader to
Appendix A for these results.
We apply the transformational equivalence theorems to
derive novel (near) optimal algorithms for answering mul-
tidimensional range query and histogram workloads under
reasonable Blowfish policy graphs G (like the grid graph).
We reduce the problem of designing a Blowfish algorithm
to that of finding a differentially private mechanism for a
new workload WG = fG(W) and a database xg = gG(x).
We design matrix mechanism algorithms for all the policy
graphs, and data dependent techniques when G is a tree or
can be approximated by a tree. For the policy graphs we
consider, we show a polylogarithmic (in the domain size)
improvement in error compared to the best data oblivious
differentially private mechanism. We also present empiri-
cal results for the tasks of answering 1- and 2-dimensional
range queries to show that our data dependent algorithms
outperform their differentially private counterparts.
Organization. The rest of this section is a brief survey of
related work. Section 2 presents notations and definitions
that we will use throughout the paper. Section 3 introduces
and motivates the Blowfish privacy framework. We describe
our main result, transformational equivalence in Section 4.
Section 5 presents novel mechanisms for answering multidi-
mensional range queries and histogram queries under various
instantiations of the Blowfish framework, and presents the
subgraph approximation lemma. In Section 6, we perform
experiments comparing the performance of our Blowfish pri-
vate mechanisms to differentially private mechanisms, and
explore data-dependent mechanisms. In the Appendix, Sec-
tion A gives examples of upper and lower bound results in
differential privacy which extend to Blowfish privacy. Sec-
tion E extends our transformational equivalence results to
policy graphs with multiple disconnected components.
Related Work. As mentioned earlier, works ([1],[5]) have
developed relaxations of differential privacy that have spe-
cific applications (e.g. location privacy). Other work has
focused on developing flexible privacy definitions that gen-
eralize all these application specific notions. The Pufferfish
framework [13] generalizes differential privacy by specifying
what information should be kept secret, and the adversary’s
prior knowledge. He et al. [11] propose the Blowfish frame-
work which also generalizes differential privacy and is in-
spired by Pufferfish. [3] investigates notions of privacy that
can be defined as metrics over the set of databases. All these
frameworks allow finer grained control on what information
about individuals is kept secret, and what prior knowledge
an adversary might possess, and thus allow customizing pri-
vacy definitions to the requirements of different applications.
As far as we aware, all previous work on relaxed privacy
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Figure 1: Ik (left) and Ck (right) workloads.
definitions have developed mechanisms directly for their ap-
plications. We don’t know of any work which shows how to
map these relaxed privacy definitions to instances of differ-
ential privacy.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Databases and Query Workloads. Let T = {v1, v2, . . . ,
vk} be a domain of values with domain size |T | = k. A
database D is a set of entries whose values come from T .
Let In be the set of all databases D over T such that the
number of entries in D is n, i.e., |D| = n. And let I be the
set of all databases with any number of entries. We repre-
sent a database D as a vector x ∈ Rk with x[i] denoting the
true count of entries in D with the ith value of the domain
T . That is, the database is represented as a histogram over
the domain. A linear query q is a k-dimensional row vector
of real numbers with answer q · x. If the entries of q are
restricted to 1’s and 0’s, we sometimes call q a linear count-
ing query, since it counts the number of entries in D with
a particular subset of values in the domain. A workload is
a set of q linear queries. So a workload can be represented
as a q × k matrix W = [q1q2 . . .qq]> ∈ Rq×k, where each
vector qi ∈ Rk corresponds to a linear query. The answer
to the workload W is W · x, whose entries will be answers
to the individual linear queries.
Example 2.1. Figure 1 shows examples of two well stud-
ied workloads. Ik is the identity matrix representing the his-
togram query on T reporting [x[1]x[2] . . .x[k]]>. Ck corre-
sponds to the cumulative histogram workload, where each
query corresponds to the prefix sum
∑i
j=1 x[j].
Differential privacy is based on the concept of neighbors.
Two databases are neighbors if they differ in one entry.
Definition 2.1 (Neighbors [6]). Any two databases D
and D′ are neighbors iff they differ in the presence of a single
entry. That is, ∃v ∈ T , D = D′ ∪ {v} or D′ = D ∪ {v}.
An algorithm satisfies differential privacy if its outputs on
any two neighboring databases are indistinguishable.
Definition 2.2 (-Differential privacy [6]). A ran-
domized algorithm (mechanism) M satisfies -differential
privacy if for any subset of outputs S ⊆ range(M), and
for any pair of neighboring databases D and D′,
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[M(D′) ∈ S].
A slightly different definition of neighbors yields a com-
mon variant of differential privacy: one database can be ob-
tained from its neighbor by replacing one entry x with a dif-
ferent value y ∈ T . The resulting privacy notation is called
-indistinguishability or bounded -differential privacy. Un-
less otherwise specified, we use the term differential privacy
to mean the original unbounded version (Definitions 2.1-2.2).
Sensitivity and Private Mechanisms. Suppose we use a
differentially private algorithmM to publish the result of a
workload W on a database D that is represented as a vector
x. M is called data independent if the amount of noise M
adds does not depend on the database x, and data dependent
otherwise. In both cases, the amount of noise depends the
sensitivity of a workload. || · ||1 denotes the L1 norm.
Definition 2.3 (Sensitivity [6, 16]). Let N denote the
set of pairs of neighbors. The L1 sensitivity of W is:
∆W = max
(x,x′)∈N
‖Wx−Wx′‖1.
Example 2.2. The L1 sensitivities of Ik and Ck are 1
and k, resp.
A well-studied class of differentially private algorithms
is called Laplace mechanism [6]. Let Lap(σ)m be a m-
dimensional vector of independent samples, where each sam-
ple is drawn from η ∝ exp(− |x|
σ
).
Measuring Errors. We use mean squared error to measure
the amount of noise injected in private algorithms.
Definition 2.4 (Error). Let W = [q1q2 . . .qq]
> be a
workload of linear queries, andM be a mechanism to publish
the query result privately. Let x be the vector representing
the database. The mean squared error of answering a work-
load W on the database x using M is
ERRORM(W,x) =
q∑
i=1
E
[
(qix−M(qi,x))2
]
where M(q,x) is the noisy answer of query q. We define
the data-independent error of a mechanism M to be
ERRORM(W) = max
x
{ERRORM(W,x)} .
Laplace mechanism is known to provide -differential pri-
vacy with mean squared error as a function of L1 sensitivity.
Theorem 2.1 ([6]). Let W be a q × k workload. The
Laplace mechanism L(W,x) = Wx + Lap(σ)q satisfies -
differential privacy, with ERRORL(W) = 2q∆2W/
2.
3. BLOWFISH PRIVACY
The Blowfish privacy framework, originally introduced by
He et al. [11], is a class of privacy notations that general-
ize neighboring databases in differential privacy. It allows
privacy policy to focus only on neighbors that users are sen-
sitive about. The major building block of an instantiation of
Blowfish is called policy graph. A policy graph encodes users’
private and sensitive information by specifying which pairs
of domain values in T should not be distinguished between
by an adversary. By carefully choosing a policy graph (or
equivalently, restricting the set of neighboring databases),
Blowfish trades-off privacy for potential gains in utility.
Definition 3.1 (Policy graph). A policy graph is a
graph G = (V,E) with V ⊆ T ∪ {⊥}, where ⊥ is the name
of a special vertex, and E ⊆ (T ∪ {⊥})× (T ∪ {⊥}).
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The above definition of policy graph is slightly different
from the one in [11] with an additional special vertex ⊥ to
generalize both unbounded and bounded versions of differ-
ential privacy. Intuitively, an edge (u, v) ∈ E defines a pair
of domain values that an adversary should not be able to
distinguish between. ⊥ is a dummy value not in T , and an
edge (u,⊥) ∈ E means that an adversary should not be able
to distinguish between the presence of a tuple with value u
or the absence of the tuple from the database. For techni-
cal reasons, if there is some edge incident on ⊥, we add a
zero column vector 0 into the workload W to correspond to
the dummy value ⊥, as well as a zero entry in the database
vector x correspondingly. So it is ensured that every node
in V is associated with a column in W and an entry in x.
We next revisit the Blowfish privacy framework.
Definition 3.2 (Blowfish neighbors). We consider
a policy graph G = (V,E). Let D and D′ be two databases.
D and D′ are neighbors, denoted (D,D′) ∈ N (G), iff exactly
one of the following is true:
• D and D′ differ in the value of exactly one entry such
that (u, v) ∈ E, where u is the value of the entry in D
and v is the value of the entry in D′;
• D differs from D′ in the presence or absence of exactly
one entry, with value u, such that (u,⊥) ∈ E.
Definition 3.3 ((,G)-Blowfish Privacy). Let G be
a policy graph. A mechanism M satisfies (,G)-Blowfish
privacy if for any subset of outputs S ⊆ range(M), and for
any pair of neighboring databases (D,D′) ∈ N (G),
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[M(D′) ∈ S].
Policy graph and Privacy guarantee. Policy graphs are
used to define how privacy will be guaranteed to users, in-
dependent of an adversary’s knowledge. For example, when
the users require the strongest privacy guarantee, the fol-
lowing two policy graphs can be used,
G = (V,E) such that E = {(u,⊥) | ∀u ∈ T } , and
G = (V,E) such that E = {(u, v) | ∀u, v ∈ T } ,
which corresponds to the unbounded and bounded versions
of differential privacy, respectively. More generally, if a pol-
icy graph does not include ⊥, we are essentially focusing on
databases from In, i.e., databases with fixed known size.
When the privacy guarantee is relaxed, we can adjust the
policy graphs so that our algorithms in Section 5 will have
higher utility. Following are two examples of designing such
policy graphs for real-life scenarios.
(Line Graph) Consider a totally ordered domain T =
{a1, a2, . . . , ak}, where ∀i : ai < ai+1. One such exam-
ple is a database of binned salaries of individuals, where ai
corresponds to a salary between 2i−1 and 2i. When only
revealing rough ranges of salaries is fine, it is OK for an
adversary to distinguish between values that are far apart
(e.g., a1 vs ak) but not distinguish between values that are
closer to each other. So we can use a line graph as our
policy graph to express this guarantee, where only adjacent
domain values ai and ai+1 are connected by an edge.
(Grid Graph) In the scenario of location data, when re-
vealing rough location information is fine but more precise
location information is private, we can use a grid policy
graph (also discussed in Section 1). Here, a 2D map uni-
formly divided into k × k grid points as nodes in the graph
(i.e., T = {1, . . . , k}×{1, . . . , k}). Only “nearby” points are
connected by edges: E = {(u, v)|d(u, v) ≤ θ} where d(u, v)
denotes the distance between two points u, v ∈ T (e.g., Man-
hattan distance) and θ is a policy-specific parameter.
Metric on databases. In general, a policy graph intro-
duces a metric over databases, which quantifies the privacy
guarantee provided by Blowfish. Consider two databases
that differ in one tuple: D1 = D ∪ {u} and D2 = D ∪ {v},
define the distance between D1 and D2 be distG(u, v), i.e.,
the length of the shortest path between u and v in G. For
mechanism M satisfying (,G)-Blowfish privacy (Defs 3.2-
3.3), we have,
Pr[M(D1) ∈ S] ≤ e·distG(u,v) · Pr[M(D2) ∈ S]. (1)
For two databases differing in more than one tuple, we can
repeatedly apply (1) for each differing tuple.
For the grid graph policy, changing the location of a tuple
from u to v results in the output probabilities ofM differing
by a factor of e if d(u, v) ≤ θ, and differing be a factor of
e·dd(u,v)/θe in general. So finer grained location information
gets stronger protection. This privacy guarantee is identical
to a recent notion called geo-indistinguishability [1].
In this paper, we assume Blowfish policy graphs are con-
nected. We discuss Blowfish policies with disconnected com-
ponents in Appendix E.
4. TRANSFORMATIONALEQUIVALENCE
We now present our main result, called transformational
equivalence, which we will use to design Blowfish private
algorithms later in the paper. This result establishes a
mechanism-preserving two way relationship between Blow-
fish privacy and differential privacy. In general, our trans-
formation can be stated as follows: For policy graph G,
there exists a transformation of the workload and database,
(W,x)→ (WG,xG) such that Wx = WGxG, and a mech-
anism M is an (,G)-Blowfish private mechanism for an-
swering workload W on input x if and only if M is also an
-differentially private mechanism for answering WG on xG.
However, we can’t hope to show this result in general. We
prove that for certain mechanisms transformational equiva-
lence holds only when distances on a graph can be embedded
into points in L1 with no distortion. It is well known [17]
that not all graphs permit such embeddings.
Hence, we show different results for different restrictions
on M and G. In Section 4.1, we show that under a class of
mechanisms called the matrix mechanism, transformational
equivalence holds for any policy graph. In Section 4.2, we
show via a metric embedding-like argument that when G is a
tree, transformational equivalence holds for any mechanism
M. In Section 4.3, we state the negative result for gen-
eral graphs and mechanisms, and present an approximate
transformational equivalence that uses spanning trees of G
albeit with some loss in the utility. All of our results rely
on the existence of a transformation matrix PG with certain
properties, whose construction is discussed in Section 4.4
4.1 Equivalence for Matrix Mechanism
Li et al [15] describe the matrix mechanism framework for
optimally answering a workload of linear queries. The key
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insight is that while some workloads W have a high sensi-
tivity, they can be answered with low error by answering a
different strategy query workload A such that (a) A has a
low sensitivity ∆A, and (b) rows in W can be reconstructed
using a small number of rows in A.
In particular, let A be a p × k matrix, and A+ denote
its Moore-Penrose pseudoinverse, such that WAA+ = W.
The matrix mechanism is given by the following:
MA(W,x) = Wx + WA+Lap(∆A/)p (2)
where, Lap(λ)p denotes p independent random variables
drawn from the Laplace distribution with scale λ. Recall
that ∆A is the sensitivity of workload A. It is easy to see
that all matrix mechanism algorithms are data independent
(i.e., the noise is independent of the input dataset).
In order to extend matrix mechanisms to Blowfish, we
define the Blowfish specific sensitivity of a workload, ∆W(G)
analogously to Definition 2.3:
Definition 4.1. The L1 policy specific sensitivity of a
query matrix W with respect to policy graph G is
∆,W(G) = max
(x,x′)∈N(G)
‖Wx−Wx′‖1
Let PG be a matrix that satisfies the following properties.
We will describe its construction in Section 4.4.
• PG has |V | − 1 rows and |E| columns.
• Let WG = WPG. Then ∆W(G) = ∆WG . I.e., the
sensitivity of workload W under Blowfish policy G is the
same as the sensitivity of WG under differential privacy.
• PG has full row rank (and therefore a right inverse P−1G ).
For vector x we let xG denote P
−1
G x.
Given such a PG, we can show our first transformational
equivalence result.
Theorem 4.1. Let G be a Blowfish policy graph and W
be a workload. Suppose PG exists with the properties given
above. Then the matrix mechanism given by Equation 2 is
both a (,G)-Blowfish private mechanism for answering W
on x and an -differentially private algorithm for answering
WG on xG. Since Wx = WGxG, the mechanism has the
same error in both instances.
Proof. We show that
Wx+WA+Lap(
∆A(G)

)p = WGxG+WGA
+
GLap(
∆AG

)p.
First,
WPGP
−1
G x = WIkx = Wx.
Next, by assumption we have that ∆A(G) = ∆AG . Finally,
WGA
+
G = WPG(APG)
+
= WPGP
+
GA
+
= WA+ (PG has full row rank) 2
4.2 Equivalence when G is a Tree
When G is a tree, we can show something stronger, that
transformational equivalence holds for any mechanism M.
More formally, suppose PG has the following property.
Claim 4.2. If G is a tree, any pair of y, z ∈ Rk are neigh-
bors according to the Blowfish policy G if and only if P−1G y
and P−1G z are neighbors according to unbounded differential
privacy (which are vectors with L1 distance of 1).
We construct a PG satisfying Claim 4.2 in Section 4.4.
Our stronger transformational equivalence result follows.
Theorem 4.3. Let x ∈ Rk represent a database, W be a
workload with q linear queries, and G = (V,E) be a Blowfish
policy graph and a tree. We can find an invertible mapping
given by f(x,W, G) = (P−1G x,WPG), where PG is a matrix
depending on G, such that M is a (G, )-Blowfish private
mechanism for answering (W,x) with error α if and only
if M is an -differentially private mechanism for answering
(WPG,P
−1
G x) with error α.
Proof. Suppose PG satisfies the properties given at the
beginning of the section. Then, mechanismM will have the
same error on both instances, since the true answers to the
workloads are the same in both cases:
WPGP
−1
G x = WIkx = Wx.
Additionally, the mapping is invertible, since WPGP
−1
G =
W and PGP
−1
G x = x. M is both (,G)-differentially private
on W,x and -differentially private on WG,xG, since the
mapping preserves neighbors.
4.3 Equivalence forGeneralGraphs andMech-
anisms
We can show that we can not hope to prove transforma-
tion equivalence for general graphs and mechanisms. First
we define an embedding of graphs.
Definition 4.2. Let G = (V,E) be a graph. Let ρ be
a deterministic mapping from vertices in V to real valued
vectors. Let dG(u, v) denote the shortest distance between
vertices u and v, and d(ρ(u), ρ(v)) = ||ρ(u) − ρ(v)||1 the
L1 distance between the mapped vectors. We define the
stretch of mapping ρ to be maxu,v∈V d(ρ(u), ρ(v))/dG(u, v),
or the maximum multiplicative increase in distances due to
the mapping. Similarly the shrink of ρ is defined as minu,v∈V
d(ρ(u), ρ(v))/dG(u, v), or the smallest multiplicative decrease
in distances. We call ρ an isometric embedded if stretch and
shrink equal to 1.
We now show that for graphs with no isometric embed-
ding into points in L1, transformational equivalence does
not hold. It is well known that such graphs exist. One ex-
ample is the cycle on n vertices, for which no deterministic
mapping is known with stretch less than (n− 1) [17].
Theorem 4.4. Let G be a graph that does not have an
isometric embedding into points in L1. There exists a mech-
anismM and workload W such that for any transformation
of (W,x) → (WG,xG) such that Wx = WGxG, either M
is not an (,G)-Blowfish private mechanism for answering
W on x, or M is not a -differentially private mechanism
for answering WG on xG.
We refer the reader to Appendix C for all proofs in this
section. We would like to note that transformational equiv-
alence holds for policy graphs that are trees, since trees can
be isometrically embedded into points in L1, and the PG we
construct is one such mapping. Moreover, the proof for The-
orem 4.4 requires a mechanismM that is data-dependent; it
uses the exponential mechanism that introduces noise that
depends on the input. We believe data dependence is nec-
essary for the negative result, and hence we were able to
show transformational equivalence for matrix mechanism al-
gorithms (that are data independent).
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Despite the negative result, we next show an approximate
transformational equivalence for general graphs and mech-
anisms with some loss in utility. The error in our approx-
imate transformation is proportion to the stretch resulting
from embedding G into a spanning tree of G, G′. Transfor-
mational equivalence can then be applied on G′ giving us an
approximate equivalence under the original graph.
Lemma 4.5. (Subgraph Approximation) Let G = (V,E)
be a policy graph. Let G′ = (V,E′) be a spanning tree of
G on the same set of vertices, such that every (u, v) ∈ E is
connected in G′ by a path of length at most ` (G′ is said to
be an `-approximate subgraph1). Then for any mechanism
M which satisfies (,G′)-Blowfish privacy, M also satisfies
(` · ,G)-Blowfish privacy.
Corollary 4.6. Let G be a graph and let G′ be an `-
approximate spanning tree. SupposeM is an  differentially
private mechanism for WG′ ,xG′ . Then, M is an (` · ,G)-
Blowfish private mechanism for W,x. Since Wx = WGxG,
the mechanism has the same error in both instances.
A well-known result of Fakcharoenphol et al [8] (Theo-
rem 2) shows that any metric can be embedded into a distri-
bution of trees with O(logn) expected stretch. It would be
desirable to use this result to give a O(log(n))-approximate
subgraph for any graph G. However, because the bound
on stretch only holds in expectation, our privacy guarantee
would only hold in expectation! A deterministic embedding
with low stretch does not always exist. To see this, consider
an n-vertex cycle. Any spanning tree consists of all but one
edge (u, v) from the cycle. While u and v were distance
1 apart in the cycle, they are distance n − 1 apart in the
spanning tree! If we picked a spanning tree at random by
randomly choosing the edge that was dropped the expected
stretch is only 2. Using a union bound over all pairs in this
example, we can also see that it is impossible to guarantee
a low stretch (and therefore a privacy guarantee) with high
probability. Therefore, we cannot apply Lemma 4.5 in a
general way to find a suitable spanner for any policy graph
G. However, the lemma is still useful in many cases and we
will use it throughout the rest of the paper.
4.4 Construction of PG
Our construction of PG from the policy graph G is re-
lated to the vertex-edge incidence matrix, where every row
corresponds to a vertex in G, every column corresponds to
an edge in G. A column has two non-zero entries (1 and -1)
in the rows corresponding vertices connected by the corre-
sponding edge. We can view PG and P
−1
G as linear trans-
formations from the vertex domain V to the edge domain
E. While x corresponds to counts on vertices of G, the
transformed database xG = P
−1
G x would assign weights to
edges in G. Similarly, while an original linear query q ∈W
associates weights on (a subset of) vertices in G, a query
qG ∈WG = WPG associates weights on (a subset of) edges
in G. This intuition will be very useful when using the
equivalence result to design (,G)-Blowfish algorithms.
We cannot just use the vertex-edge incidence matrix as
PG since it may either have k + 1 rows (when G contains
1While we that require V (G) = V (G′), the proof does not
require G′ to be a subgraph of G (i.e., E′ ⊆ E). But it
suffices for the applications of this technique in this paper.
 1 0 0−1 1 0
0 −1 1

⊥
 1 0 01 1 0
1 1 1

Figure 2: Example policy graph G and their PG,P
−1
G
⊥), or since it does not have an inverse (when G does not
contain ⊥). We will describe our construction of PG that
satisfies all our constraints in the rest of the section. The
details are quite technical, and an uninterested reader can
skip over them and still understand the rest of the paper. As
mentioned before, we assume G is connected. Our construc-
tions also extend to policy graphs that are disconnected and
are discussed in Appendix E.
Case I: Unbounded (with ⊥)
We start our construction with a simple case. Let G =
(V,E) be a connected undirected graph, with V = T ∪ {⊥},
|T | = k. We define PG to be the following k × |E|-matrix:
let each row of PG correspond to a value in T ; for each edge
(u, v) ∈ E (u, v 6= ⊥), add a column to PG with a 1 in the
row corresponding to value u, a −1 in the row corresponding
to value v (order of 1 and −1 is not important), and zeros in
the rest of the rows; and for each edge (u,⊥) ∈ E (u 6= ⊥),
add a column with a 1 in the row corresponding to u and
zeros in the rest. Figure 2 gives an example.
It is easy to see that PG has all the properties required
for our transformational equivalence results to hold.
Lemma 4.7. Let W be a workload, and G be a policy
graph. Then ∆W(G) = ∆WG .
Lemma 4.8. PG constructed above has rank k.
As PG has rank k, and k ≤ |E|, it has a right inverse:
P−1G = P
>
G(PGP
>
G)
−1. Finally, we prove Claim 4.2: When
G is a tree PG isometrically maps neighbors under policy
graph G to neighbors under differential privacy.
Lemma 4.9. Suppose PG is constructed for a Blowfish
policy graph G as above, and G is a tree. Any pair of
databases y, z ∈ Rk are neighbors according to the Blow-
fish policy G if and only if P−1G y and P
−1
G z are neighboring
databases according to unbounded differential privacy.
We refer the reader to Appendix D for all the proofs.
Case II: Bounded (without ⊥)
We next consider a slightly more involved case: let G =
(V,E) be a connected undirected graph, with V = T , where
|T | = k. If we follow the same construction as in Case I,
rows in the resulting PG are not linearly independent any
more, and thus P−1G is not well-defined (no right inverse can
be defined for PG). Fortunately, for every such G, we can
replace one vertex in V with ⊥, denoting the resulting graph
as G′, and correspondingly modify W and x to W′,x′ resp.,
such that (a) PG′ is full rank, (b) answering W
′ on x′ under
policy G′ has the same error as answering W on x under G,
and (c) Wx can be reconstructed from the answer to W′x′.
Pick any value v ∈ V ; in G′ = (V ′, E′), let V ′ = V −{v}+
{⊥} and E′ = E − {(v, u) | u ∈ V } + {(⊥, u) | (v, u) ∈ E}.
Then G′ falls into Case I, so we can construct PG′ and P
−1
G′
as in Case I.
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We transform x by removing the entry x[v] (denoted as
x−v). We then transform W to W by removing the col-
umn v and rewriting all queries that depend on x[v] to use
n−∑j 6=v x[j], where n = ∑i∈T x[i] is the size of the input
database, without any loss in our ability to answer the orig-
inal queries. We can do this because when ⊥ is not in G,
neighboring databases have the same number of tuples. We
can show that our construction satisfies all three require-
ments (a), (b), and (c) discussed above.
Lemma 4.10. Consider G′, W′, and x−v constructed above.
We have: i) Wx = W′x−v + c(W, n), where c(W, n) is a
constant vector depending only on W and the size of the
database; and ii) any two databases y and z are neighbors
under G if and only if y−v and z−v are neighbors under G′.
Technical details of the construction and proof of correct-
ness are presented in Appendix D.1.
Example 4.1. Recall the Ck workload from Figure 1. In
Ck, the last row computes n, the size of the database. Since
we already know n, we do not need to answer that query
privately. We can equivalently consider a workload C′k with
all zeros in the last row and removing the last column (since
it would have all zeros). We can also remove the all zero
row that remains resulting in a (k − 1) by (k − 1) matrix.
Consider the line graph with k nodes connected in a path.
We can replace the rightmost node with ⊥ (Figure 2) to get
G′. PG′ is a (k − 1)× (k − 1) matrix that is full rank, and
P−1G′ is equal to C
′
k.
Thus, by Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 4.10, the minimum
error for answering Ck under Blowfish policy G
1
k is equal to
the minimum error for answering C′k ·PG′ = Ik−1 under -
differential privacy. Since Ik−1 is the identity workload, an
optimal data independent strategy would be to add Laplace
noise to yield a total error of Θ(k/2).
5. BLOWFISH PRIVATE MECHANISMS
In this section, we derive mechanisms (with near optimal
data independent error) for answering range queries and his-
tograms under Blowfish policies to illustrate the power of the
transformational equivalence theorem. In Section 5.1 we de-
fine the types of queries and graphs we will be focusing on.
In Sections 5.2 and 5.3 we present strategies for answering
multi-dimensional range queries under the grid graph policy.
These algorithms are data independent and incur the same
error on all datasets. In Section 5.4, we extend our strate-
gies to get data dependent algorithms for Blowfish. Figure 3
summarizes our data independent error bounds. The error
incurred by data dependent versions of our algorithms will
be evaluated in Section 6.
5.1 Workloads and Policy Graphs
We note that the data independent mechanisms we present
for one dimensional range queries under G1k and G
θ
k (Sec-
tions 5.2.1 and 5.3.1) are similar to the ones presented in
the original Blowfish paper [11]. We present them here to
illustrate our transformational equivalence and subgraph ap-
proximation results, and to help the reader understand our
novel mechanisms for multi-dimensional range queries.
Consider a multidimensional domain T = [k]d, where [k]
denotes the set of integers between 1 and k (inclusive). The
Workload
Error per query
Blowfish -Diff. [20]
Rk
G1k Θ(1/
2)
O(log3 k/2)
Gθk O(
log3 θ
2
)
Rkd
G1
kd
O(d log
3(d−1) k
2
)
O(log3d k/2)
Gθ
kd
O(d3 log
3(d−1) k log3 θ
2
)
Figure 3: Summary of data independent error
bounds.
size of each dimension is k and thus the domain size is kd.
A database in this domain can be represented as a (column)
vector x ∈ Rkd with each entry xi denoting the true count of
a value i ∈ T . It is important to note that our results in this
paper can be easily extended to the case when dimensions
have different sizes.
A multidimensional range query can be represented as
a d-dimensional hypercube with the bottom left corner l
and the top right corner r. In particular, when d = 1, a
range query q(l, r) is a linear counting query which count
the values within l and r in the database x, i.e., q(l, r)x =∑
l≤i≤r xi. Let Rk denote the workload of all such one
dimensional range queries, ı.e., Rk = {q(l, r) | l, r ∈ [k]∧l ≤
r}. Similarly, let Rkd = {q(l, r) | l, r ∈ [k]d ∧ l ≤ r} denote
the workload of all d-dimensional range queries. Note that
each range query can be represented as a kd-dimensional
row vector, and Rkd can be represented as a q× kd matrix,
where q = (k(k−1)/2)d is the total number of range queries.
The class of policy graphs Gθkd = (V,E) we consider here
are called distance-threshold policy graphs. They are defined
based on the L1 distance in the domain T = [k]d. Consider
two vertices u = (u1, . . . , ud) and v = (v1, . . . , vd) ∈ V ⊆
[k]d, the L1 distance between is |u − v| = |u1 − v1| + · · · +
|ud−vd|. There is an edge (u, v) in E if and only if |u−v| ≤ θ.
Two special cases of Gθkd and their semantics were discussed
in Section 3 as line graph (G1k) and grid graph (G
θ
k2).
5.2 Range Queries under G1kd
In this section we first describe the easy case of 1D range
queries before considering multi-dimensional range queries.
We will heavily utilize the structure of the transformed query
workload in this section. The following lemma helps relate
the queries in W to the queries in WG.
Lemma 5.1. Let q be a linear counting query (that is, all
entries in q are either 1 or 0), and G = (V,E) be a policy
graph. Let {v1, . . . , v`} ⊆ V be the vertices corresponding
to the nonzero entries of q. Then, the nonzero columns of
q ·PG = qG correspond to the set of edges (u, v) with exactly
one end point in {v1, . . . , v`}. That is,
{(u, v)| {u, v} ∩ {v1, . . . , v`} | = 1} .
Proof. Each entry c of qG satisfies c = u− v where u, v
are entries in q and (u, v) ∈ E. c is nonzero exactly when
u 6= v, or equivalently, when
| {u, v} ∩ {v1, . . . , vk} | = 1.
5.2.1 Rk under G1k
We begin with a simple case: one-dimensional range queries
under a one-dimensional line graph. We outline the appli-
cation of Theorem 4.3 in Algorithm 1. Recall from Exam-
ple 4.1 that the inverse of PG1
k
is the cumulative histogram
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Require:
W is a workload of range queries, x is a database.
1: function 1DRange(W,x)
2: xG ← P−1G1
k
x // prefix sums from x
3: x˜G ← Differentially private estimate for xG
4: WG ← WPG1
k
// differences between prefix sum pairs
5: return WGx˜G1
k
Algorithm 1: 1D range queries.
workload. Therefore, the transformed database xG = P
−1
G1
k
x
corresponds to the set of prefix sums in x. Algorithm 1 com-
putes a differentially private estimate of xG (say using the
Laplace mechanism).
Figure 4: A one dimensional range query on vertices
is transformed into a query on edges (represented by
dashed lines).
Next, we transform the queries. Note that for any range
query q = [l, r], by Lemma 5.1 qG contains at most two
nonzero elements (this is illustrated in Figure 4) correspond-
ing to the edges (l− 1, l) and (r, r+ 1). The values of xG at
these edges are the prefix sums
∑l−1
i=1 xi and
∑r
i=1 xi, and
their difference is indeed the answer to the original range
query. We can show the following bound on the data inde-
pendent error of Algorithm 1.
Theorem 5.2. Algorithm 1 with x˜G1
k
= xG1
k
+ Lap(1/)
answers workload Rk with Θ(1/
2) error per query under
(,G1k)-Blowfish privacy.
Proof. Every qG1
k
(l, r) ∈ RG1
k
can be reconstructed by
summing at most two queries in ˜xG1
k
. Each entry in ˜xG1
k
has Θ(1/2) error from the Laplace mechanism. So each
qG1
k
(l, r) incurs only Θ(1/2) error.
In fact we show that Algorithm 1 is the optimal data inde-
pendent algorithm for answering range queries in 1D under
G1k. We omit the proof due to space constraints.
Lemma 5.3. Any (,G1k)-Blowfish private mechanism an-
swers Rk with Ω(1/
2) error per query.
The best known data independent strategy (with mini-
mum error) for answering Rk under -differential privacy
is the Privelet strategy [20] with a much larger asymptotic
error of O(log3 k/2) per query.
5.2.2 Rkd under G1kd
G1kd is a grid with k
d vertices and d·(k−1)·kd−1 edges. Let
us consider the problem in two dimensions first. (see Fig-
ure 5a). The transformed domain (after using Theorem 4.3)
would be the set of edges in the graph. Consider a 2D range
query q([x, y], [x′, y′]) (grey box in figure). The transformed
query qG has non-zero entries corresponding to edges on the
boundary of the original range query (dashed lines in the fig-
ure). Note that these edges can be divided into 4 contiguous
ranges of edges; i.e., qG is the sum of 4 disjoint range queries
in the transformed domain.
(a) G1
52
with a two dimen-
sional range query, rep-
resented by a grey box.
The edges in the trans-
formed query (satisfying
Lemma 5.1), are shown
with dashed lines. These
edges form four ranges.
(b) For each row of ver-
tical edges, we answer all
ranges over the row. One
such row is shown with
dashed lines. We must do
the same for columns, and
one such column is shown
with dotted lines.
Figure 5: Answering Rk2 under G
1
k2 .
Thus, a strategy for answering the transformed query
workload in two dimensions would be to answer all one
dimensional range queries along the rows (dashed vertical
edges in Fig 5b) and columns (dotted horizontal edges in
Fig 5b) under differential privacy. There are 2(k − 1) such
sets of range queries. Note that these sets of range queries
are disjoint, and can each be answered using -differential
privacy (under parallel composition). Any query qG can be
computed by adding up the answers to 2 row range queries
and 2 column range queries.
In d dimensions, qG will be the sum of 2d (d−1)-dimensional
range queries on the transformed dataset xG, each corre-
sponding to a face of the d-dimensional range query. Our
strategy would be to answer d(k−1) sets of (d−1)-dimensional
range queries under -differential privacy.
We bound the data independent error of our algorithm.
Theorem 5.4. Workload Rkd can be answered with
O(d log3(d−1) k/2)
error per query under (,G1kd)-Blowfish privacy.
Proof. For each dimension, we must answer k−1 sets of
(d−1)-dimensional range queries, for a total of (k−1)·d sets
of (d−1)-dimensional ranges. As we have shown, all of these
sets are disjoint and can be answered in parallel. Therefore,
the total error is just the error of answering one of these
sets of ranges. We can answer these ranges using Privelet
[20] with O( log
3(d−1) k
2
) error. To answer our query, we must
sum 2d of these ranges for a total error of O(d log
3(d−1) k
2
).
By Theorem 4.3, we can answer Rkd under G
1
kd with the
same error per query.
We get a Ω(log3 k) factor better error than differential
privacy using Privelet [20] under a fixed dimensionality d.
5.3 Range Queries under Gθkd
We next consider answering range queries under a more
complex graph. Unlike in the case of G1kd , the workloads
resulting from the use of Theorem 4.3 to the Gθkd policy are
not well studied under differential privacy. Hence, we will
introduce a new tool, called subgraph approximation, and
then use it to design Blowfish private mechanisms.
5.3.1 Rk under Gθk
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(a) G310, each vertex is connected to other vertices
within distance 3 along the line.
(b) H310, each vertex is connected to the nearest red
vertex to its right.
(c) A range query shown on H310. The transformed
query consists of the edges highlighted in purple and
their left end points always form two contiguous ranges.
(d) Our strategy will answer all range queries on 3 sets
of edges, each set shown in a different color. These sets
of edges are disjoint.
Figure 6: A summary of a strategy for answering Rk under Gθk for θ = 3, k = 10. Our results hold in general.
We next present an algorithm for answering one dimen-
sional range queries under, Gθk. These results generalize the
results from Section 5.2.1, and will leverage subgraph ap-
proximation (Lemma 4.5).
We first describe how to obtain a subgraph Hθk from G
θ
k.
We designate k/θ vertices at intervals of θ; call these “red”
vertices. In Hθk , consecutive red vertices are connected to
form a path (like the line graph). All non-red vertices are
only connected to the next red vertex (to its right); i.e., ver-
tices {1, 2, . . . , θ−1} are connected only to vertex θ, vertices
{θ + 1, θ + 2, . . . , 2θ − 1} are connected only to vertex 2θ,
and so on. We order the edges in Hθk by their left endpoints.
Like G1k, H
θ
k is also a tree with k − 1 edges. Figure 6a
shows G310 and Figure 6b shows H
3
10. Note that for all θ, a
pair of adjacent vertices in Gθk are connected by a path of
length ` ≤ 3 in Hθk . So we can use subgraph approximation.
Consider some query in Rk, say q(l, r). The correspond-
ing query qHθ
k
in RHθ
k
consists of all edges with one of
the end points within the range (l, r) (Lemma 5.1). If l ≤
xθ ≤ r ≤ yθ, where xθ and yθ are the smallest red nodes
greater than l and r, then these edges correspond to {(i, xθ) |
(x − 1)θ ≤ i < l} and {(j, yθ) | (y − 1)θ ≤ j < r} (edges
connected to dotted nodes in Figure 6c). That is, the trans-
formed query qHθ
k
(l, r) corresponds to the difference of two
range queries (according to the ordering of edges in Hθk).
Moreover, each range query is of length at most θ – within
[(x− 1)θ, xθ] for some x.
Thus, our strategy for answering all the queries in RHθ
k
=
Rk ·PHθ
k
is as follows. Partition the transformed domain (or
edges in Hθk) into disjoint groups of θ – all edges connecting
a red node to nodes on its left form a group (see Figure 6d).
Next, answer all range queries of length at most θ within
each of these groups under -differential privacy (say using
Privelet). Finally, reconstructing queries qHθ
k
(l, r) ∈ RHθ
k
using the computed range queries. Since these sets of range
queries form disjoint subsets of the domain, they all can use
the same  privacy budget (by parallel composition).
Theorem 5.5. There exists a mechanism that answers
workload Rk with
O
(
log3 θ/2
)
error per query under (,Gθk)-Blowfish privacy.
Proof. Our strategy partitions the transformed domain
(or edges in Hθk) into groups of size θ, and answers range
queries over them. Using privelet to compute range queries
within each partition results in O(log3 θ/2) error per query.
Queries in RHθ
k
are differences of at most 2 range queries,
and thus also incur at most O(log3 θ/2) error. By The-
orem 4.3, the same mechanism answers Rk and satisfies
(,Hθk)-Blowfish privacy with O(log
3 θ/2) error per query.
For every edge (u, v) ∈ Gθk, u and v are connected by a
path of length at most 3, this strategy also ensure (3,Gθk)-
Blowfish privacy. Thus, using the above strategy with pri-
vacy budget /3 gives us the required result.
5.3.2 Rkd under Gθkd
We now turn our attention to multidimensional range
queries under Gθkd . Our strategy will be similar to the one
in Section 5.3.1. We find a subgraph to approximate Gθkd .
We show the queries of the transformed workload can be de-
composed into range queries on edges of bounded size, and
our strategy is to answer these range queries.
To get a subgraph Hθk , we divide G
θ
kd into d-dimensional
hypercubes with edge length θ
d
(see Figures 7a and 7b). We
designate the vertices at the corners of the cubes as “red”
vertices. We pick a mapping of hypercubes to red vertices.
For example, in the 2-dimensional case, we may map each
square to its upper right red vertex. Each non-red vertex
within a cube is connected to this selected red vertex (we
pick a consistent mapping for vertices that are on the bound-
ary of cubes). We call these internal edges. The red vertices
are then connected in a grid (like G1kd) with external edges.
Due to space constraints we give a brief sketch of our
strategy. Given a range query q, the transformed query will
correspond to a set of internal and a set of external edges (as
per Lemma 5.1). Since external and internal edges are dis-
joint, our strategy answers the transformed query restricted
to the external edges and internal edges independently, each
under -differential privacy.
Since the external edges form a grid graph G1(dk/θ)d (Fig-
ure 7c), we can use our strategy from Section 5.2.2 to an-
swer this part of the transformed query with error at most
O(d log
3(d−1) d·k/θ
2
). We can show that the non-red end points
of the internal edges featuring in the transformed query
for 2d d-dimensional range queries. However, each of these
range queries has a width at most θ in one of the dimensions
(see Figure 7d). Thus like in Section 5.2.2, it is sufficient
to answer all d-dimensional range queries having width at
most θ in one dimension. However, the edges in these range
queries are not disjoint, and hence we can only use θ/d pri-
vacy budget for answering these range queries, resulting in
the following error bound:
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(a) (b)
θ
2
(c)
θ
2
(d)
Figure 7: Transforming queries in Rk2 under G
θ
k2 . (a) G
2
52 , edges are vertices with L1 distance ≤ 2. (b) A
section of H2k2 . Internal edges connect red nodes and external edges connect black nodes to red nodes. (c)
A 2D range query superimposed on H2k2 . We only show the divisions in θ/2 blocks of vertices. Within each
block, all vertices would be connected to the upper right corner. The grid of lines shows all the external
edges. Highlighted in purple are the external edges which satisfy Lemma 5.1 and therefore appear in the
transformed query. (d) The green patterned rectangles show the sets of vertices corresponding to the internal
edges in the transformed query. There are 4 such rectangles, and for each one either the height or length
is bounded by θ. Note that there are other ways in which we could divide the green patterned region into
4 rectangles, we arbitrarily chose one. Our strategy is to answer all range queries over each row of squares,
and each column of squares. We illustrate using specific values for θ and k, but our results hold in general.
Theorem 5.6. Workload Rkd can be answered with
O(d3 · log
3(d−1) k log3 θ
2
)
error per query under (,Gθkd)-Blowfish privacy.
Discussion. Our Blowfish mechanisms under G1kd and G
θ
kd
policy graphs improve upon Privelet by a factor of log3 k,
but incur additional error by a factor of d and d3 log3 θ re-
spectively. Thus the proposed mechanisms are better than
using Privelet when d log θ is small compared to log k. This
is true in the case of location privacy where d = 2 and θ (10s
of km) is usually much smaller than k (1000s of km).
5.4 Data Dependent Algorithms
Till now we considered data independent Blowfish mech-
anisms whose error is independent of the input database.
Recent work has investigated a new class of data depen-
dent algorithms for answering histogram and range queries
that exploit the properties of the data and incur much lower
error on some (typically sparse) datasets. In this section,
we present two methods for adapting the previously given
mechanisms to get data dependent mechanisms for Blowfish.
5.4.1 Data dependent differentially private algorithms
In all of our algorithms we employed data independent dif-
ferentially private algorithms in our strategies. We used the
Laplace mechanism for computing noisy histograms in our
strategy for answering Rk under G
1
k, and used Privelet for
answering noisy range queries in all the other cases. Instead,
when the policy graph is a tree, we could use a state-of-the-
art data dependent technique like DAWA [14] for answering
histograms and range queries under differential privacy. For
instance, DAWA computes a noisy histogram as follows: (a)
partition the domain such that domain values within a group
have roughly the same counts, (b) estimates the total counts
for each of these groups using the Laplace mechanism, and
(c) uniformly divides the noisy group totals amongst its con-
stituents. When many counts are similar (especially when
x is sparse), DAWA incurs lower error than Laplace mecha-
nism since it adds noise to fewer counts (see Section 6).
5.4.2 Using properties of the transformed database
All the example workload/policy pairs discussed in this
section are such that the transformed workload WG is “eas-
ier” to answer under differential privacy than W. Thus, the
data independent Blowfish algorithms outperform the data
independent differentially private algorithms for answering
W on x by more than a constant factor. However, this is
not true for all workloads.
Consider, for instance, the identity workload Ik that com-
putes the histogram of counts under the line graph G1k.
The transformed workload IG1
k
is the set of differences be-
tween adjacent elements in the transformed database; i.e.,
xG[i]−xG[i− 1], for all i. The transformed workload seems
no easier than the original workload.
However, we can utilize the fact that xG has special struc-
ture. Recall that P−1
G1
k
is precisely equal to the cumulative
histogram workload Ck. Thus, the counts in the trans-
formed database xG are prefix sums of the counts in x,
and are non-decreasing. We can use this property of xG
to reduce error by enforcing the non-decreasing constraint
on the noisy counts x˜G. Hay et al [10] present a simple al-
gorithm to postprocess the counts so that the error depends
on the number of distinct counts in xG. Note that whenever
a count in x is 0, a pair of consecutive prefix sums in xG are
the same. Therefore, the number of distinct values in xG
is precisely the number of non-zero entries in x. This sug-
gests that postprocessing x˜G to ensure that the counts are
non-decreasing will lead to a significant reduction of error
for sparse datasets. We can use this strategy whenever P−1G
creates constraints in xG.
6. EXPERIMENTS
In Section 5, we outlined a number of algorithms for an-
swering range query and marginal workloads under the dis-
tance threshold policies, and derived data independent er-
ror bounds for them. In this section, we implement both
data independent and data dependent versions of these al-
gorithms and empirically evaluate their error on a number
of real one and two dimensional datasets. In particular, we
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Description Domain Scale % Zero
Size Counts
A Histogram of new links by time added to a subset of the US patent citation network 4096 2.8× 107 6.20
B Histogram of personal income from 2001-2011 American community survey 4096 2.0× 107 44.97
C Histogram of new links by time added to HepPH citation network 4096 3.5× 105 21.17
D Frequency of search term “Obama” over time (2004-2010) 4096 3.4× 105 51.03
E Number of external connections made by each internal host in an
IP-level network trace collected at the gateway router of a major university. 4096 2.6× 104 96.61
F Histogram on “capital loss” attribute of Adult US Census dataset 4096 1.8× 104 97.08
G Histogram of personal medical expenses based on
a national home and hospice care survey from 2007 4096 9.4× 103 74.80
T100 Aggregated counts of number of tweets by geo location 100× 100 1.9× 105 84.93
T50 collected over 24 hours restricted to a bounding box of 50× 50 1.9× 105 69.24
T25 50N,125W and 30N,110W (western USA) 25× 25 1.9× 105 43.20
Table 1: Description of datasets
 1e+06
 1e+07
 1e+08
 1e+09
 1e+10
twitter25 twitter50 twitter100
Av
g.
 S
qu
ar
ed
 E
rro
r p
er
 Q
ue
ry
Dataset
Privelet
Dawa
Transformed + Privelet
(a) 2D-Range ( = 0.01, G1
k2
)
 100
 1000
 10000
 100000
 1e+06
A B C D E F G
Dataset
Laplace
Dawa
Transformed + Laplace
Transformed + ConsistentEst
Trans + Dawa + Cons
(b) Hist ( = 0.01, G1k)
 100
 1000
 10000
 100000
 1e+06
 1e+07
 1e+08
 1e+09
A B C D E F G
Dataset
Privelet
Dawa
Transformed + Laplace
Transformed + ConsistentEst
Trans + Dawa + Cons
(c) 1D-Range ( = 0.01, G1k)
 100000
 1e+06
 1e+07
 1e+08
 1e+09
512 1024 2048 4096
Dataset
Privelet
Dawa
Transformed + Laplace
Trans + Dawa
(d) 1D-Range ( = 0.01, G4k)
 10000
 100000
 1e+06
 1e+07
 1e+08
twitter25 twitter50 twitter100
Av
g.
 S
qu
ar
ed
 E
rro
r p
er
 Q
ue
ry
Dataset
(e) 2D-Range ( = 0.1, G1
k2
)
 1
 10
 100
 1000
 10000
A B C D E F G
Dataset
(f) Hist ( = 0.1, G1k)
 10
 100
 1000
 10000
 100000
 1e+06
 1e+07
A B C D E F G
Dataset
(g) 1D-Range ( = 0.1, G1k)
 1000
 10000
 100000
 1e+06
512 1024 2048 4096
Dataset
(h) 1D-Range ( = 0.1, G4k)
Figure 8: Comparison of /2-Differentially private and (,G)-Blowfish algorithms for four workloads.
compare the error attained by /2-differentially private al-
gorithm for a task to that of (,G)-Blowfish mechanisms for
the same task. The highlights of this section are:
• For 1-D range queries, since the policy graphs are “tree-
like”, we can design data dependent algorithms for Blow-
fish by utilizing state-of-the-art data dependent algo-
rithms for differential privacy, thanks to Theorem 4.3.
The transformed workload is simpler and permits an or-
der of magnitude improvement in error for both the data
independent and data dependent implementations.
• For 2-D, we are not aware of a low stretch embedding of
the grid policy graph to a tree. Though we are restricted
to the use of matrix mechanism algorithms, our new
Blowfish private algorithms outperform the best data de-
pendent differentially private algorithms on sparse datasets.
• For histograms, while the transformed workload is not
easier than the original, we can exploit constraints in the
transformed database to obtain improvements in error.
Datasets: We evaluate the error on 7 different one dimen-
sional datasets and 3 two dimensional dataset (see Table 1).
All the one dimensional datasets A-G have the same domain
size (4096) but vary in their scale (total number of records),
and were used in prior work (notably [14]). We aggregate
our two dimensional dataset to a domain size of 100 × 100
(T100), 50× 50 (T50), and 25× 25 (T25), by imposing uni-
form grids of appropriate size on the space. Finally, we
aggregate over dataset “D” to domain sizes 4096 (no aggre-
gation), 2048, 1024, and 512. Note that most datasets are
sparse (low scale and high % of zero counts).
Policies: We use G1k and G
4
k for one dimensional and G
1
k2
for two dimensional datasets.
Workloads: We consider four workloads. 1D-Range is 10,000
random one-dimensional range queries. 2D-Range is 10,000
random two dimensional range queries. Hist is the his-
togram workload. We report the average mean square error
over 5 independent runs, and use  ∈ {0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1}.
Results for  ∈ {0.001, 1} are deferred to Appendix B.
6.1 Results
Hist: We compare 5 algorithms on our 1-D datasets under
policy graph G1k. We use Laplace mechanism and DAWA
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[14], the best data independent and state-of-the-art data
dependent differentially private algorithms for the workload,
resp. For Blowfish, we use Laplace mechanism on the trans-
formed database to get a data independent strategy (Sec-
tion 5.4). We called this “Transformed + Laplace”. Since
G1k is a tree, we can construct two data dependent Blowfish
algorithms as follows: (1) We use the consistency postpro-
cessing algorithm to the output of Transformed + Laplace
to ensure that the noisy counts x˜G are non-decreasing. We
call this “Transformed + ConsistentEst”. (2) We compute
a noisy histogram on xG using DAWA and then apply con-
sistency (called “Transformed + Dawa + Cons”).
We see that the (,G)-Blowfish data independent tech-
nique (Transformed + Laplace) is only a factor of 2 better
than the data independent (/2)-differentially private algo-
rithm (Laplace Mechanism). Significant gains in error over
the data independent methods are seen in sparse datasets
E, F & G by using DAWA (for differential privacy) and the
two data dependent Blowfish algorithms (note log scale on
y-axis). When  = 0.1 (and 1) one of the Blowfish data de-
pendent algorithms outperform the two differentially private
mechanism on all but two datasets F and G. These are very
sparse, and DAWA achieves lower error. On the other hand,
the transformed database (which is the set of prefix counts)
is not as sparse, and thus Blowfish algorithms achieve higher
error. At smaller  values (0.01, 0.001), DAWA outperforms
one or both the data dependent Blowfish algorithms on all
datasets except A and B. Designing data dependent Blow-
fish mechanism for Hist under G1k with “optimal” error is
an interesting open question.
1D-Range: First, we consider the G1k policy graph. We
consider Privelet and DAWA as the data independent and
dependent algorithms under differential privacy, resp. The
Blowfish data independent strategy is to use Laplace mech-
anism on the transformed database. We again implement
two data dependent algorithms for Blowfish – enforce the
non-decreasing constraint on the noisy x˜G computed using
the Laplace mechanism and DAWA, resp. In this case, we
see 2-3 orders of magnitude difference in the error of all the
Blowfish algorithms from their differentially private coun-
terparts! This is because both the transformed workload
and the transformed database are “easier” that the original
workload and database. We observe that while the Blowfish
data dependent strategy using DAWA is better than the
one using Laplace mechanism on all datasets when  = 1,
the reverse is true for  = 0.1, 0.01. We conjecture this is
true because the lower privacy budget results in poorer data
dependent clustering for DAWA.
We also study the error incurred under the G4k policy
graph under datasets of varying domain sizes (k = 4096, 2048,
1024, 512). Since G4k is not a tree, we use a spanning tree H
4
k
as described in Section 5.3.1 and Figure 6. Since G4k can be
embedded into H4k with a stretch of 3, by Corollary 4.6 an
/3-differentially private mechanism for answering WH4
k
on
xH4
k
also is a (,G4k)-Blowfish private mechanism for answer-
ing W on x. The Blowfish data independent algorithm is
Laplace mechanism on the transformed database. The data
dependent algorithm is DAWA on the transformed workload
and database. Both use privacy budget /3. Again, the
blowfish mechanisms have at least an order of magnitude
smaller error than their differentially private counterparts.
While the error for the differentially private algorithms in-
creases as the domain size increases, the error for the Blow-
fish mechanisms does not change with domain size. This is
because the transformed workload is like the identity matrix.
While the Blowfish data dependent algorithm is better than
using Laplace mechanism for  = 1, it is worse for smaller .
2D-Range: We consider three algorithms for the grid graph
policy G1k2 . Privelet and DAWA are the data independent
and data dependent differentially private algorithms. The
blowfish data independent strategy is to use Privelet for the
one dimensional range queries in the transformed workload.
We do not know of a data dependent algorithm under Blow-
fish for G1k2 , since it is not “tree-like”. Though each trans-
formed query requires 4 one dimensional range queries (over
the transformed database), we still see that the Blowfish al-
gorithm (a) significantly outperforms Privelet, and (b) im-
proves over DAWA when the domain size is large.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We systematically analyzed error bounds on linear query
workloads under the Blowfish privacy framework. We showed
that the error incurred when answering a workload under
Blowfish is identical to the error incurred when answering a
transformed workload under differential privacy for a large
class of privacy mechanisms and graphs. This, in conjunc-
tion with a subgraph approximation result, helped us derive
strategies for answering linear counting queries under the
Blowfish privacy framework. We showed that workloads can
be answered with significantly smaller amounts of error per
query under Blowfish privacy compared to differential pri-
vacy, suggesting the applicability of Blowfish privacy policies
in practical utility driven applications.
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APPENDIX
A. EXTENDINGLOWERBOUNDRESULTS
IN DIFFERENTIAL PRIVACY
In this section, we show that error upper and lower bound
results in -differential privacy and (, δ)-differential privacy
can be extended to Blowfish privacy. Any -differentially
private mechanismMG for answering WG on xG gives us a
(,G)-Blowfish private mechanism on for answering W on x.
The following corollary follows directly from Theorem 4.3.
Corollary A.1. Let W be a workload, G be a policy
graph, and x be a database. Let f(WG,xG) be a lower bound
on the error of answering WG with xG under -differential
privacy. That is,
ERRORM(WG,xG) = Ω(f(WG,xG)) ∀M.
Then, f(WG,xG) is a lower bound for answering W with
x under (,G)-Blowfish privacy.
Our transformational equivalence result applies to every -
differentially private mechanism for answering linear queries
when policy graphs look like trees. While we can’t discuss
every result in differential privacy here, we give a few exam-
ples.
One nice extension is to a sequence of works on general
mechanisms for answering linear queries [9, 2, 19]. These re-
sults first find a lower bound (in this case, the lower bound is
data independent, and therefore depends only on W), then
find a general mechanism that answers any linear workload
with error bounded against the lower bound. In particu-
lar, Bhaskara et al [2] give a O(log2 q) approximation to the
expected L2 error for linear workloads under -differential
privacy, where q is the number of queries. For policy graphs
G that has a subtree T with low distortion of `, we can use
the same algorithm on WT to get a O(`
2 · log2 q) approx-
imation to the expected L2 error for answering W under
(,G)-Blowfish privacy! This follows from Corollary 4.6 and
the fact that WG is always linear as long as W is linear and
the two workloads have the same number of queries.
A number of results pertain to (, δ)-differential privacy,
which allows a small probability δ of failing the indistin-
guishability condition. We can similarly define (, δ,G)-
Blowfish privacy, and our transformational equivalence re-
sult directly extends to this variant as well. Thus, we can
also extend upper and lower bound results on (, δ)-differential
privacy to Blowfish.
Li and Miklau [16] give a lowerbound for a popular class of
mechanisms called matrix mechanisms for answering work-
loads of linear queries. Since transformational equivalence
holds for all policy graphs for matric mechanisms, we can
extend their bound for all Blowfish policies:
Corollary A.2. Any matrix mechanism based strategy
for answering workload W that satisfies (, δ,G)-Blowfish
privacy has error at least
P (, δ)
1
nG
(λ1 + . . .+ λs)
2
where P (, δ) = 2 log(2/δ)
2
, λ1, . . . , λs are the singular values
of WG, and nG is the number of columns of WG (same as
the number of edges in G).
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Figure 10: Blowfish SVD lower bounds ( = 1, δ =
.001).
Figures 10a and 10b illustrate the relationship between
the above lower bound on error and size of the domain for
Rk (under G
θ
k) and Rk2 (under G
θ
k2) respectively. We plot
the original lower bound for unbounded differential privacy
([16]) and the new lower bounds we derived for Blowfish
policies Gθk and G
θ
k2 for various values of θ. Additionally, we
show a lower bound for bounded differential privacy, which
is obtained by using the complete graph (on T ) as the policy.
For the one dimensional range query workload we see
that minimum error under unbounded differential privacy
increases faster than the minimum error under Gθk for suffi-
ciently large domain sizes. For two dimensional ranges, error
under Blowfish policy Gθk2 is only better than unbounded
differential privacy for θ = 1. However, all values of θ per-
form better than bounded differential privacy. Note that for
sets of linear queries, it is possible for the sensitivity of a
workload under bounded differential privacy to be twice the
sensitivity of the workload under unbounded differential pri-
vacy, and thus have up to 4 times more error. Characterizing
analytical lower bounds for these workloads and policies is
an interesting avenue for future work.
B. MORE EXPERIMENTS
Figure 9 compares our Blowfish algorithms to the corre-
sponding differentially private counterparts for  ∈ {0.001, 1.0}.
C. PROOFS FROM SECTION 4.3
C.1 Impossiblity ofGeneralTransformational
Equivalence
Theorem C.1. Let G be a graph that does not have an
isometric embedding into points in L1. There exists a mech-
anismM and workload W such that for any transformation
of (W,x) → (WG,xG) such that Wx = WGxG, either M
is not an (,G)-Blowfish private mechanism for answering
W on x, or M is not a -differentially private mechanism
for answering WG on xG.
Proof. Let W be the identity workload I. We assume
that policy graph G cannot be isometrically embedding into
L1 (e.g., the cycle on V ). We consider datasets x with a
single entry. Thus there are |V | input databases, and each
input corresponds to a vertex in G; hence, we will abuse
notation and denote by x both the dataset and the vertex
in G. There are also |V | distinct outputs since we consider
the identity workload. Let xG be the point in the L1 that
the vertex x is mapped to. We denote distance in G as
dG(·, ·), and L1 distance as d(·, ·). We consider two cases:
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Figure 9: Comparison of /2-Differentially private and (,G)-Blowfish algorithms for four workloads.
1. there exists z,y (each with a single entry) with d(zG,yG) =
1 and dG(z,y) > 1.
2. There exists z,y (each with a single entry) with dG(z,y) =
1 and d(zG,yG) > 1, or
Case (1): We will now construct a mechanism M that is
(,G)-Blowfish private, but not -differentially private. Let
M be the exponential mechanism that given an input x
picks an output y with probability e−·dG(x,y). It is easy to
check that M satisfies (,G)-Blowfish privacy.
However, there exists x,y such that xG and yG are neigh-
bors under differential privacy (d(xG,yG) = 1), but x and y
are not neighbors under policy graph G (since dG(z,y) > 1).
Therefore, M does not satisfy differential privacy:
P [M(xG = x]
P [M(xG = y] = e
·dG(z,y) > e (3)
Case (2): Proof is similar. We construct M as the ex-
ponential mechanism that uses the distances on xG as the
score function.
C.2 Subgraph Approximation
Lemma C.2. (Subgraph Approximation) Let G = (V,E)
be a policy graph. Let G′ = (V,E′) be a spanning tree of
G on the same set of vertices, such that every (u, v) ∈ E is
connected in G′ by a path of length at most ` (G′ is said to
be an `-approximate subgraph2). Then for any mechanism
M which satisfies (,G′)-Blowfish privacy, M also satisfies
(` · ,G)-Blowfish privacy.
2While we that require V (G) = V (G′), the proof does not
require G′ to be a subgraph of G (i.e., E′ ⊆ E). But it
suffices for the applications of this technique in this paper.
Proof. Assume D and D′ are neighboring databases un-
der policy graph G. Then D = A ∪ {x} and D′ = A ∪ {y}
for some database A, and (x, y) ∈ E. From our assumption,
x and y are connected by a path in G′ of length at most `.
Therefore, there exist a sequence of vertices x = v1, . . . , vj =
y such that (vi, vi+1) ∈ E and j < `. Further, A ∪ {vi} and
A∪ {vi+1} are neighbors under policy graph G′. Therefore,
Pr[M(A ∪ {vi}) ∈ S] ≤ e · Pr[M(A ∪ {vi+1}) ∈ S].
Composing over all 1 ≤ i ≤ j gives us the desired result.
D. PROPERTIES OF PG
Lemma D.1. Let W be a workload, and G be a policy
graph. Then ∆W(G) = ∆WG .
Proof. This follows from the definition of PG. We have
∆W(G) = max
(x,x′)∈N(G)
‖Wx−Wx′‖1
= max
vi∈cols(WG)
‖vi‖1 2
Lemma D.2. PG constructed in Section 4.4 has rank k.
Proof. It is sufficient for us to show that if G is a tree,
then PG has rank k. When a connected graph G is not a
tree, we can consider a spanning tree T of G. If the columns
of PG that correspond to the edges in T have rank k, then
PG will also have rank k.
A spanning tree has k + 1 vertices (including ⊥) and k
edges. Thus, PT is a k × k-matrix. It is sufficient to prove
that the linear system PTy = 0 has an unique solution
y = 0. Each entry in y can be considered as a weight y[e]
associated with an edge e in the tree T .
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Suppose there is an edge e connected to a degree 1 node
v ∈ T that is not connected to ⊥. The row PT [v, :] has
only one non-negative entry in the column corresponding to
e. Thus, PTy = 0 implies y[e] = 0. We can inductively
use the same argument on the tree T ′(V − {v}, E − {e}),
and the matrix PT ′ constructed by removing the row corre-
sponding to node v from PT . In the end, we are left with a
tree T ? having only edges connected to ⊥. But this would
correspond to a matrix PT? = I (since each column has ex-
actly one position set to 1), and the solution to Iy = 0 is
y = 0.
Lemma D.3. Suppose PG is constructed for a Blowfish
policy graph G as above, and G is a tree. Any pair of
databases y, z ∈ Rk are neighbors according to the Blow-
fish policy G if and only if P−1G y and P
−1
G z are neighboring
databases according to unbounded differential privacy.
Proof. Let y′ = P−1G y and z
′ = P−1G z. Consider y−z =
PGy
′−PGz′. Since y′ and z′ are neighbors under differential
privacy, y′−z′ = iˆ, where iˆ is a vector with a single non-zero
entry, which is 1. So, y− z = PG iˆ is a single column of PG.
We have, either
• y−z is equal to a column of PG corresponding to (u, v) ∈
E where u, v 6= ⊥, or
• y−z is equal to a column of PG corresponding to (u,⊥) ∈
E where u 6= ⊥.
In either case, y and z are neighbors according to G.
For the proof in the other direction, suppose y and z are
neighbors, that is, y− z = pG where pG is a column of PG.
In this direction, we will use that G is a tree, and therefore
PG is square, which implies P
−1
G is both a left and right
inverse. We can write
PGP
−1
G y −PGP−1G z = pG =⇒
P−1G ·PG(P−1G y −P−1G z) = P−1G · pG = iˆ,
for some unit vector iˆ.
D.1 Technical Details for Case II
More formally, assuming v is the ith value, let
W′ = WD = W
 Ii−1 0−1>i−1 −1>k−i
0 Ik−i
 ,
where Ij is an identity matrix with size j, 1j is a j-dim
vector with all entries equal to 1, and thus D is k× (k− 1)-
matrix. The following lemma shows requirements (b) and
(c) to complete our construction.
Lemma D.4. Consider G′, W′, and x−v constructed above.
We have: i) Wx = W′x−v + c(W, n), where c(W, n) is a
constant vector depending only on W and the size of the
database; and ii) any two databases y and z are neighbors
under G if and only if y−v and z−v are neighbors under G′.
Proof. We define c(W, n) to be a vector with values
−n for the entries corresponding to affected rows of W, and
zero elsewhere. Consider a query q′ in W′ which depends
on v, the column of W no longer present in W′. That is,
q′ corresponds to an affected row of W, and we denote by
q the original query in W. By definition of W′, q′x′ is the
answer to n− qx.
Proof of ii): Suppose z and y are neighbors under G. We
consider two cases:
1. z and y differ in two entries adjacent in G, neither of
which is v.
2. z and y differ in two entries adjacent in G, one of which
is v.
In the former case, y−v and z−v differ in the same two en-
tries, and these vertices are still adjacent in G′. Therefore
they are still neighbors. In the latter case, z−v and y−v
differ in a single entry, w. w was originally connected to v
in G and is therefore connected to ⊥ in G′. Therefore, z−v
and y−v are neighbors according to G′.
Using the above lemma, for any given workload W on
database x and policy graph G in this case, we can first
convert them into W′, x′, and G′ as discussed above, apply
the transformation equivalence theorem using PG′ . We can
answer the original workload using answers from W′x′ using
i) in the above lemma.
E. BLOWFISH POLICIES WITH MULTI-
PLE CONNECTED COMPONENTS
Policy graphs can be disconnected as described in the ex-
ample below.
(Sensitive Attributes in Relational Tables): Consider tables
with d attributes, i.e., T = A1 × . . . × Ad. Suppose S (
{A1, . . . , Ad} is a set of sensitive attributes (e.g., disease
status and race) we want to protect in a table. In the
corresponding policy graph G(V,E), we have V = T , and
(u, v) ∈ E for any pair of u, v ∈ T if and only if u and v
differ in exactly one of the attributes in S.
In the above policy, there is no path between u and v if
they differ in the value of an attribute not in S. In this
case, there is no bound on probabilities when considering
database D∪{u} and D∪{v}. In particular, if G has c con-
nected components C1, . . . , Cc, Ci = (Vi, Ei), the adversary
can determine (exactly) which Vi every tuple in the database
belongs to. In the “sensitive attributes” policy, the adver-
sary can learn the values of the non-sensitive attributes of
all the tuples. Blowfish provides the flexibility of such exact
disclosure based on the level of privacy we want to protect.
Exact disclosure never occurs in differential privacy or with
connected Blowfish policies. One potential issue with such
exact disclosure is that further privacy disclosure may occur
if adversaries know additional correlations between the dis-
closed properties (e.g., non-sensitive attributes) and private
properties (e.g., sensitive properties). This is akin to privacy
disclosures from differentially private outputs to adversaries
with knowledge of correlations across records in the data
[12, 13].
E.1 TransformationalEquivalence forDiscon-
nected Policies
The transformational equivalence result also extends to
general policy graphs with more than one connected com-
ponent. If ⊥ is not connected to a component, we simply
apply the conversion discussed in Case II to reduce it to Case
I with the vertex ⊥ connected to it. Then eventually we will
have all components connected to ⊥, which essentially falls
into Case I. So Case III can be also reduced to Case I.
F. PROOF OF THEOREM 5.6
Proof. We first decompose our query into two pieces:
all internal edges, and all external edges. We find strategies
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to answer each of these queries, then sum the two to find
the answer to the desired query. Figure 7c shows the set
of external edges in the transformed query. External edges
always form a lattice, so we can answer this part of the
query using the strategy from Section 5.2.2, and this will
contribute O(d log
3(d−1) d·k/θ
2
) error.
We also need a way to answer all the internal edges. We
order these edges by their black endpoint. Consider the
set of vertices, V corresponding to the set of internal edges
which satisfy Lemma 5.1. V can be divided into 2d d-
dimensional range queries, one for each face of the original
range query. These d-dimensional range queries are bounded
by θ in the dimension orthogonal to the corresponding face
of the original range query. This is illustrated in two dimen-
sions in Figure 7d. Our strategy to answer these bounded
ranges is the following: For each dimension, divide the do-
main (which is a hypercube of size kd) into d·k
θ
layers, each
with thickness θ/d. We then answer all range queries on
each layer. For a given dimension, all layers are indepen-
dent. Therefore, we can answer these sets of range queries
in parallel. However, the sets of range queries for different
dimensions are not independent. An edge used in some hor-
izontal layer will also be used in some vertical layer. We can
answer each set of range queries using the Privelet frame-
work with error
O(
log3(d−1)k log3 θ/d
2
).
However, because range queries in different dimensions are
dependent, we must divide up our -budget d ways. Addi-
tionally, each query is made up of 2d of these range queries.
The total error of this strategy is therefore
O(d3 · log
3(d−1)k log3 θ/d
2
).
The total error is the sum of the errors from the strategies
of answering the internal edges and the external edges. This
sum is just Equation F.
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